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 Despite the apparent wind 
down of the war in Eastern Ukraine, 
we should not deceive ourselves. 
The crisis that started in Kiev in ear-
ly 2014, and which took a profound-
ly destabilising international turn in 
the months since, is far from over. 
Several ceasefires have been signed 
but ultimately they have proved un-
satisfying in the extreme. In Septem-
ber 2014, the first Minsk agreements 
were quickly forgotten as both par-
ties in Eastern Ukraine took the op-
portunity to stock up resources and 
ammunition before launching new 
attacks. And at this game, the rebels 
of Novorossiya have a distinct ad-
vantage over the Ukrainian regular 
forces: Russia. No one can honestly 
believe that Russia is anything but a 
warring party in the war being played 
out in the Donbas. This is not civil 
strife, it is – and has always been – 
an undeclared and limited interstate 
war pitting Moscow against Kiev. And 
the object of Russian actions is not 
Ukraine, it is the entire European 
continent. 
Russian responsibility
The truth of Russia’s implication in 
Ukraine is hardly surprising when we 
look at the nature of the conflict and 
at its inception. Hundreds of articles 
and extensive analysis has shown 
Russia’s hand in the ongoing crisis. 
Without Russian action, there would 
be no war in the Donbas. The start-
ing point in the conflict in the East 
can be set further West, in Kiev. On 
21 November 2013, then Ukrainian 
president, Viktor Yanukovych decid-
ed to forgo an Association Agree-
ment (AA) with the European Union 
which would have strengthened the 
ties between Kiev and Brussels and 
would have brought Ukrainians a 
little bit closer to the EU. This agree-
ment was years in the making, ne-
gotiated by two presidents and their 
administrations, and welcomed by a 
large part of Ukrainian society. But 
at the eleventh hour, president Ya-
nukovych turned it down. This was 
largely due to Russian pressures and 
to European shortsightedness. At the 
time, Ukraine faced serious econom-
ic problems and Yanukovych needed 
important financial support to sta-
bilise the situation and preserve his 
own office. In Brussels, the diplomats 
and administrators in charge of the 
EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, 
under which the Association Agreee-
ment was to be signed, failed to un-
derstand the need to offer Ukraine a 
real incentive to closer relations. 
The EU’s idea was that the Associa-
tion Agreement would provide Kiev 
with serious measures to prosper 
economically and improve political-
ly. But this long term view lost sight 
of the fact that Yanukovych felt he 
needed aid now, not many years in 
the future. Then came Russia with 
its own incentives package. To get 
the 15 billion euros he needed, Ya-
nukovych only had to refuse signing 
the agreement with Europe. And he 
did so, much to Brussels’ dismay and 
to Moscow’s delight. Even then, what 
could have been only a footnote in 
European history became a critical 
juncture when Ukrainians took to 
the streets in Kiev to protest Yanu-
kovych’s turnabout. For weeks, they 
stayed mobilised, clamouring for 
the president to sign the Association 
Agreement, in vain. The protests rap-
idly took a deeper political turn in the 
following days, when calls for a signa-
ture became calls for more openness, 
less corruption and ultimately, for a 
change in government. The largely 
corrupt political system of Ukraine 
came to be challenged in the streets 
of Kiev but, at the onset, the impetus 
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for this immense popular mobilisa-
tion was a demand for Europe. Most 
Ukrainians – and most Europeans for 
that matter – didn’t understand the 
technical dimensions of the Asso-
ciation Agreement but they craved 
it anyway because it meant getting 
Ukraine closer to Europe. And it was 
this deep European aspiration, this 
longing for a European future, how-
ever vague and however far, which 
prompted the start of the crisis.
Unfortunately, the EU was slow in 
understanding this and in supporting 
the Ukrainian’s aspirations. Russia, 
on the other hand, wasn’t deluded 
and its subsequent reactions were 
tailored to prevent Ukraine’s move 
to the West. Yanukovych’s ouster in 
February 2014 and the subsequent 
arrival of a new distinctly pro-Euro-
pean government in Kiev only served 
to confirm the Kremlin’s fears that 
Ukraine was shifting westwards. 
This prompted the hasty annexation 
of Crimea in March and the start of 
the war in the Donbas in April. Con-
cerning Crimea, the interpretation of 
Russia’s annexation (or “reintegra-
tion”) as being a necessary means to 
protect the inhabitants of the pen-
insula from Kiev’s “fascist” menace 
has been completely debunked. A 
few days ago, president Putin him-
self admitted that the whole pro-
cess was completely controlled from 
Moscow. Back in March, the pop-
ular referendum which led to the 
integration of Crimea in Russia was 
presented as a legitimate response 
to the new Ukrainian government’s 
animosity towards the Russians and 
Russian speaking population in the 
autonomous region. Indeed, a law 
guaranteeing the status of Russian 
as an official language was almost 
scrapped by the new central author-
ities represented in the Verkhovna 
Rada before being preserved by the 
transitional president. This measure 
– though it would have been largely 
without effect1 – nonetheless served 
as a symbolic catalyst to justify the 
consequent annexation. But even 
this version has been contradicted 
by Putin who conceded that the re-
integration of Crimea was decided 
on the night of Yanukovych’s flight 
from Kiev, before there was any men-
tion of repealing the language law. 
Russia’s actions have been coated in 
pretence and denial but it is clearer 
than ever that the Kremlin is the one 
taking the initiative in the crisis. Just 
as the Crimean annexation was de-
signed in Moscow and pulled off by 
Russian operatives, so too was the 
insurrection in the Donbas planned 
by the Russian authorites and carried 
out by Russian-backed forces. The 
“little green men” of Crimea moved 
to Donetsk, Luhansk and Sloviansk 
soon after the annexation to try and 
repeat a similar scenario in the East. 
The important territorial gains that 
the rebels have made in August 2014 
and early 2015 are due as much to 
Ukrainian military weakness as to the 
strength of Russian support. Moscow 
might not want to annex the Donbas 
– it doesn’t – but its responsibility 
in the continuing war and the thou-
sands of deaths in Eastern Ukraine is 
undeniable2.
The triple dimension of Rus-
sian ambitions
A lot has been written on why keep-
ing Ukraine inside Moscow’s orbit 
was so important to the Kremlin. For 
the sake of brevity and clarity, we can 
analyse Moscow’s strategy on three 
distinct levels: national, regional and 
international. The most obvious is 
the regional level. In this reading of 
events, Ukraine has a specific impor-
tance to Russia, on historical, cultural 
and economic terms. Hence, Russia 
can’t allow Kiev to drift west or it 
would lose the strong ties that bind 
the two Slavic states together. Fur-
thermore, Russia needs Ukraine for 
its own regional integration project: 
the Eurasian (Economic) Union (EEU). 
With this project, Moscow aspires to 
be recognised as an integrative re-
gional hegemon, both by the mem-
bers of the EEU (Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Armenia) and by outside bod-
ies like the EU. This was one of the 
stakes of the Association Agreement 
pullback in November 2013. Indeed, 
the free-trade agreement included in 
the AA is incompatible with the Cus-
toms Union that is put in place inside 
the EEU. Thus, Ukraine had to choose 
between both projects, and Russia 
made sure to incite Yanukovych to 
make the right choice by offering him 
strong economic incentives. This was 
important to Moscow because with-
out Ukraine, the EEU is inherently 
limited. Ukraine is the second-largest 
market in the Former Soviet Union, a 
dynamic states by those standards, 
and no regional project can succeed 
without her3. Hence, back in Novem-
ber 2013, Russia wanted to make 
sure that the EEU would remain vi-
able and that Ukraine would not go 
west. Events since then changed the 
situation dramatically – Russia can 
no longer dream of including Ukraine 
in the EEU – but this was the start-
ing-point for the crisis.
On the national level as well, Russia 
has a lot of interest in controlling 
the crisis. The Euromaidan demon-
strations in Kiev showed what could 
happen when a corrupt government 
loses the support of the people. Ya-
nukovych was ousted not only be-
cause he refused to sign the AA, but 
also because he was not recognised 
has a legitimate authority anymore. 
The will of the Ukrainian people was 
violently demonstrated in the streets 
of Kiev and later confirmed in the 
presidential and legislative elections 
of 2014. Ukrainian society aspires 
for a more democratic, open and 
reform-driven government, on the 
model of the European democracies. 
Euromaidan is thus an even more 
profound revolution than the 2004 
orange revolution was. Now, as then, 
there is a real desire for democracy, 
equated as a desire for Europe as a 
normative model. This democrat-
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ic experiment, if it succeeds, would 
pose a grave threat to the current 
authoritarian regime in the Kremlin. 
Ukrainian society is a smaller version 
of Russian society and it is feared 
that what happens in Kiev could hap-
pen in Moscow. Of course, this inter-
pretation is simplistic – Ukraine is not 
actually a smaller Russia – but the 
worry is real in Russian decisional cir-
cles. To prevent a Euromaidan on Red 
Square, Ukraine’s experiment with 
European democracy must fail. And 
there is no better way to ensure that 
than by maintaining a costly insurrec-
tion in its Eastern regions. The war 
in the Donbas serves two purposes 
in this regard. The first is to bleed 
Ukraine dry and prevent any serious 
reform from happening. The second 
is to punish Kiev and serve as a warn-
ing to opposition forces in Moscow 
or in the neighbouring states. What-
ever the cost, Russia will not permit 
colour revolutions on its border. By 
controlling the narrative in the me-
dia, the Russian authorities can pres-
ent their action as a fight against a 
destabilising force, and thus Putin’s 
popularity remains sky-high. This has 
the benefit of creating a war mental-
ity in Russia, distracting people from 
the increasingly bad economic sit-
uation. It’s a win-win-win for Putin: 
he ensures his popularity, he keeps 
Ukraine unstable and he warns the 
rest of the post-Soviet region.
Finally, on the international level, the 
conflict in Ukraine is viewed by the 
Kremlin – and presented by the Rus-
sian media – as a proxy war between 
Russia and the West. The Ukrainian 
army is “NATO’s foreign legion” bent 
on encircling Russia and weakening 
it. Regardless of whether this view 
is really shared by president Putin, it 
is evident that the actions taken by 
Russia in Ukraine concern not only 
Ukraine but Europe as a whole. The 
aim is to divide the European Union 
and to weaken transatlantic relations 
between Brussels and Washington. 
So far, it is succeeding. EU member 
states have a difficult time agreeing 
on a common position, divided be-
tween a whole range of pro-Russian 
and anti-Russian sentiment. The lat-
ter position is represented by the 
Baltic States and Poland, who feel 
threatened by Moscow’s aggressive 
actions and who want the EU – and 
NATO – to take a firmer stand in the 
issue. On the pro-Russian part of the 
spectrum, we find countries such as 
Hungary, Cyprus or Greece where the 
new Syriza government has made no 
secret of its closeness to Russia. This 
dissonance hampers attempts to 
present a common EU foreign policy 
and to have any significant impact on 
the ground. Furthermore, European 
disunion exacerbates the difficulty 
of finding a common Euro-American 
response to Russian actions. All this 
plays into the Kremlin’s hand and 
Vladimir Putin loses no opportunity 
to further deepen the transatlan-
tic rift. Russian ambitions towards 
Ukraine go far beyond Donetsk, Mar-
iupol or even Kiev. They embrace the 
entire European continent.
Minsk and Meseberg
The European Union’s response to 
Russia’s violent intervention in the 
Donbas has so far been woefully in-
adequate. Other than more-or-less 
strongly worded declarations or lim-
ited sanctions, Europe hasn’t done 
much. To be sure, given the inherent 
difficulties in setting up a common 
foreign policy, this is notable anyway. 
But given what is at stake, it is still 
not enough. Faced with an aggres-
sive Russia determined to overturn 
the current European security order, 
sanctions are disappointing. Even 
more so when there isn’t even a con-
sensus on keeping these sanctions 
going in the coming months. 
On the diplomatic front also, the EU’s 
efforts are definitely less-than-stel-
lar. The latest agreement signed in 
Minsk in February 2015 was signed 
not by EU representatives but by the 
leaders of the “Normandy group” 
comprising Germany, France, Russia 
and Ukraine. Federica Mogherini, the 
EU’s High Representative, was no-
where to be seen in Minsk. For sure, 
this was Vladimir Putin’s aim when 
he agreed to a new round of diplo-
matic talks. He would much rather 
deal with a few countries on a bilat-
eral basis than to deal with the EU 
as a whole, which would put him in 
a much weaker position. Thus, Rus-
sia manages – once again – to divide 
the EU. Germany has reluctantly tak-
en the lead in Europe’s dealings with 
Moscow, joined by France which is 
all too eager to appear relevant on 
the European scene. On 11 February 
2015, Angela Merkel and François 
Hollande met with Vladimir Putin 
and Petro Poroshenko to work out a 
deal on returning peace to Ukraine. 
The Minsk II agreements are largely 
favourable to Moscow. The ceasefire 
cements the rebels’ territorial gains 
while the constitutional arrange-
ments to be put in place in Ukraine 
are dependent on the separatists’ 
– and Russia’s – goodwill. What is 
more, Crimea is never mentioned 
in the document. Russia’s unlawful 
annexation of a part of sovereign 
territory seems to be accepted as a 
fait-accompli. Obviously, no one ex-
pects Russia to return the peninsula 
to Ukraine. It has de facto become 
Russian land and will remain so in 
the foreseeable future. But to choose 
to ignore the crime is a mistake. We 
cannot allow Russia to get away with 
violating the main principle on which 
European security is based: territo-
rial integrity of sovereign states. To 
brush aside the Crimean annexation 
would be to endanger the entire Eu-
ropean order.
Evidently though, this is exactly what 
Russia wants. One of the main objec-
tives of Russian foreign policy is to 
become a pillar of the European se-
curity architecture and to gain a say 
in the EU’s and NATO’s policy deci-
sions. In 2009, then president Med-
vedev proposed a new version of 
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European security that would have 
in effect made NATO redundant and 
put Russia on an equal footing with 
the whole of the EU4. A year later, 
Russia came up with another ar-
rangement in the so-called Meseberg 
Memorandum. This was the result 
of a bilateral Russo-German meeting 
which suggested the setting up of a 
joint “EU-Russia Political and Securi-
ty Committee”. The first test of this 
Committee would have been to find 
a solution to the frozen conflict in 
Transnistria. Nothing came of the ini-
tiative – not least because Germany 
didn’t have the power to commit the 
EU as a whole – but, here again, the 
aim for Russia was to bypass NATO 
and create a new security order 
based on two pillars: EU and Russia. 
For this goal, Moscow was willing to 
pay the price of abandoning Trans-
nistria. Just as now, the Donbas is 
merely a negotiating chip in Russia’s 
hand, on the road to creating a new 
European system. 
A new era? 
In the years to come, the annexation 
of Crimea will be regarded as a turn-
ing point in History, equivalent to the 
fall of the Berlin wall. In November 
1989, we passed from one world to 
another when the Cold War ended 
as the bricks fell in Berlin. In March 
2014, the uncontested annexation 
of Crimea inaugurated a new era in 
international relations – at least on 
the European continent. The crisis in 
Ukraine has demonstrated that Rus-
sia is unsatisfied with the current in-
ternational rules and wants to build 
something new, maybe on the model 
of the 19th century “Concert of Na-
tions” when a few Powers decided 
for the entire world, dividing invio-
lable spheres of influence between 
them. In this system there would be 
no place for sovereign states other 
than the deciding Powers. This is Eu-
rope as Russia wants it to be and it is 
prepared to pay a high price to build 
it. Of course, such a system would be 
anathema to the European political 
and normative project. The Europe-
an Union cannot accept dividing lines 
without sacrificing its own identity. 
Russian ambitions are incompatible 
with the EU’s vision, Russia wants a 
system based on autocracy and do-
minion, the EU’s essence is based on 
democracy and equality. The conflict 
in Ukraine is thus as much about 
the European order as it is about 
Ukraine’s integrity. The EU was di-
rectly implicated from the start of the 
crisis in Euromaidan and its response 
must acknowledge this. A long term 
strategy by the EU is necessary to 
take into account the changing Euro-
pean order and to remodel relations 
with Russia on a new uncompromis-
ing basis. 
Many different options are on the 
table. We can send weapons to 
Ukraine, we can reinforce existing 
sanctions, we can severely limit our 
dependence on Russian gas. Most of 
all, we can call Putin’s bluff and admit 
Russia’s responsibility in the destabi-
lisation of the European continent. 
Ukraine’s future is not the only one 
that is at stake, now is the time to take 
a firm stand and take clear decisions. 
Whatever they are are, they will be 
hard. But taking a spectator seat and 
hoping that things will turn out for 
the best, that our “strategic partner-
ship” with Russia can be salvaged is 
ill-fated. Whatever happens, we can 
never go back to the way things were 
before 18 March 2014. And whatever 
happens, we can no longer pretend 
that Russia is a partner, seeking the 
same objectives for Europe that we 
do. Change has come, and we would 
do better to control the change that 
is still to come than sit idly by and suf-
fer the consequences.
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